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Abstract The topic of corporate distress and turnaround has been of interest to
organizational change theory for many decades. This article considers existing
reviews in discussing the current body of turnaround literature across multiple
research fields and structures its work along a holistic framework. The numerous
facets of corporate turnaround, resorting to general corporate restructuring research
classifications, are clustered in a more detailed manner than those that merely rely
on two commonly employed turnaround dimensions: ‘‘retrenchment’’ and ‘‘recov-
ery.’’ The authors develop an agenda for future research based on this cross-dis-
ciplinary literature aggregation by highlighting current gaps and offering potential
research questions. The review contributes to the understanding of corporate distress
and turnaround by integrating different research streams. Additionally, the work
emphasizes the need for further harmonization and operationalization in turnaround
success metrics.
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1 Corporate distress and turnaround: a review and research agenda
Corporate distress and turnaround has been a subject of research for many decades.
Guiding conceptual works set the stage starting in the 1970s and early 1980s
(Altman 1968; Bibeault 1982; Gordon 1971; Hambrick and Schecter 1983; Hofer
1980; Schendel and Patton 1976; Schendel et al. 1976). The 1979 Bankruptcy
Reform Act and the related merger and acquisition wave in the 1980s amplified the
number of bankruptcy filings during that time, thus increasing the topic’s relevance
(Johnson 1996; Markides 1995). Early empirical works, such as studies by Robbins
and Pearce (1992) or Pant (1991), offered the first insights into the turnaround wave
of the 1980s.
Scholars from various fields have steadily enhanced our understanding of the
topic based on this initial trend in publications, yielding many findings and
definitions. Generally, turnaround can be defined as ‘‘a decline and recovery from
distress’’ (Schendel et al. 1976). Grounded in the first conceptual discussions by
Hofer (1980) or Bibeault (1982), corporate turnaround literature generally clusters
organizational responses during distress as either ‘‘operational’’ or ‘‘strategic’’ in
nature (Eichner 2010; Hambrick and Schecter 1983; Ofek 1993; Pearce and Robbins
1993; Schendel et al. 1976; Trahms et al. 2013). Although some works integrate
such new facets as different process stages (Chowdhury 2002) or contextual
interdependencies (Castrogiovanni and Bruton 2000), corporate turnaround research
seems to adhere to this dichotomous categorization of organizational change. The
initial reviews by Pearce and Robbins (1993) and Pandit (2000) reinforce this
concept, and even more recent works sort these findings accordingly, such as the
overview presented by Trahms et al. (2013).
However, as firms fighting for survival are confronted with the need for
comprehensive organizational change, possible turnaround strategies are manifold
and fundamentally differ in their nature or theoretical grounding (Bowman and
Singh 1993; Ndofor et al. 2013). Hence, reviewing works from the corporate
distress and turnaround field from the perspective of only two dimensions might
lead to spurious conclusions. For instance, as Loui and Smith (2006) confirm,
empirical findings regarding the efficiency of top management replacements as a
turnaround strategy seem contradictive when neglecting procedural and contextual
influences. However, in considering the timing and the process stage of CEOs’
dismissal, it becomes clear that only executive replacements initiated during the
early stages of distress positively affect turnaround (Daily and Dalton 1995;
Tushman and Rosenkopf 1996). Conversely, following the concept of organiza-
tional inertia, installing new management after distress has prevailed for several
years, resulting in a diminished ability to react and lower turnaround probabilities.
Although prior reviews already provide an overview of selected publications on the
matter, they fall short in comprehensively clustering the investigated turnaround
strategies and do not account for the many facets of potential crisis responses as well
as different research fields’ corresponding foci regarding corporate turnaround. No
study to our knowledge accounts for all turnaround literature, encompassing
content, process, and context dimensions across multiple research fields. We resort
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to a more detailed conceptual organizational change framework to close this gap
and overcome the shortcomings of a merely dichotomous classification of
turnaround. Although some turnaround frameworks incorporate such different
contextual settings as exogenous or internal causes for decline (Tushman and
Rosenkopf 1996), or consider different process stages (Barker and Duhaime 1997),
the interdependencies between process, context, and the chosen turnaround strategy
have been neglected. However, considering the underlying context and timing helps
avoid misinterpretation when comparing different turnaround decisions (Pettigrew
2012).
The work at hand offers four additional contributions, and especially when
compared to Trahms et al.’s (2013) most recent review. First, we integrate findings
from the general management field with studies from accounting, economics,
sociology, and especially finance. Trahms et al. (2013) based their review and
research agenda on 40 articles from eight general management journals; however,
our analysis comprises 276 works from 25 journals, spanning across the five
research fields. Second, by resorting to different research fields, like. finance, we can
discuss additional turnaround measures. While Trahms et al. (2013) focused on
response factors related to managerial cognition, strategic leadership, and
stakeholder management, our review additionally discusses the effects of such
finance-related turnaround moves as debt restructuring. Third, Trahms et al. (2013)
base their research agenda on, and limit it to, resource orchestration, strategic
leadership, and stakeholder management. This paper’s research agenda, in contrast,
encompasses considerably more research areas, attempting to reflect potential
research opportunities along all dimensions of its framework. Fourth, we adopt
Trahms et al.’s (2013) discussion regarding turnaround outcomes. Our argument
parallels that of Haleblian et al. (2009) in the field of mergers and acquisitions
(M&A), as we demonstrate current shortcomings regarding the operationalization of
success measures. Although Trahms et al. (2013) already offer a more detailed
metric with seven different turnaround outcomes, their operationalization remains
unclear. We resort to definitions from other research fields, namely finance and
M&A, to contribute to this discussion and fill the remaining white spots.
Thus, this work provides a comprehensive overview of the status quo on
turnaround research, integrating findings from relevant research streams and
theoretical lenses. This article contributes to corporate turnaround research as a part
of the organizational change theory as the first to consolidate and structure over 260
relevant publications according to a holistic framework, further detailing opera-
tional and strategic turnaround. We account for the different facets of content,
process, and context research to bridge the gap between mostly detached
substreams. Further, the review focuses on the meta-topic of measuring corporate
turnaround success and aims to provide a basis for the prospective second ‘‘high
tide’’ of turnaround research, most likely resulting from the recent global financial
crises. The study summarizes the last decades of relevant research, builds on
existing reviews on the matter, pinpoints still unsolved and contradicting topics,
identifies important gaps, and defines an agenda for future research.
We adapt Brauer’s (2006) and Haleblian et al.’s (2009) approaches to reviewing
literature by following a six-step approach of identifying, reviewing, and classifying
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relevant work. First, by defining a review period from 1992 to 2013, we ensured the
inclusion of all publications of the first ‘‘high tide’’ of turnaround literature resulting
from the M&A wave in the 1980s until 2013. Second, we identified five research
areas to focus our search, namely, management, finance, economics, accounting,
and sociology (Brauer 2006). Third, we conducted a keyword search using the
aforementioned constraints, employing EBSCO and JSTOR databases as well as the
Social Science Research Network. We accounted for a possible publication bias by
screening Google Scholar for relevant working papers as well as unpublished works.
The keywords spanned bankrupt*, crisis, decline, default, distress*, survival, and
turnaround. As the employed framework resorts to concepts of general organiza-
tional change, divest*, reorganization, and restruct* were checked as additional
keywords. Fourth, a manual search by issue of the top 25 peer-reviewed journals
over the defined period yielded additional publications.1 Fifth, we identified ground-
setting works prior to 1992 by employing an ancestry search within the key papers.
This assured the inclusion of publications leading back to Altman (1968), who
provided one of the first bankruptcy prediction models that still lays the foundation
for numerous works in this field (Chava and Jarrow 2004; Ohlson 1980; Shumway
2001; Zmijewski 1984). The initial five steps yielded 1040 articles generally related
to the research topic. These 1040 works were screened in more detail, in a sixth and
final step before coding, and were prioritized according to relevance. This resulted
in a sample of 276 papers.
Plotting the sample relative to research fields over time (cf. Fig. 1) demonstrates
that despite the generally constant publication quantity, a considerable peak occurs,
with several years’ lag after a period of general turmoil. The period of 1992–1993
brought an above-average quantity of relevant research resulting from the M&A
wave in the 1980s. The period of 2004–2006 was again marked to a lesser extent by
an increase in publications, particularly in general management literature, based
primarily on the disturbances originating in the Asian financial crisis of 1997, which
escalated after the 2001 September 11th attack. When comparing the finance and
management research, it is noteworthy that finance scholars increasingly chose this
topic in recent years, almost reaching publication levels observed in management
research. The average publication lag, or the time elapsed from the analyses’ end, as
identified by the sample’s last point in time, and the year of publication, is
7.62 years, with a slightly positive skewness of 0.76 (cf. Fig. 2). Thus, macroe-
conomic distress and its consequences for firms can be clearly linked to publication
behavior regarding turnaround and restructuring research in the following years.
Thus, it can be assumed that 2015 and its subsequent years will again experience a
1 Selected journals are as follows: Management: Academy of Management Journal, Administrative
Science Quarterly, Journal of International Business Studies, Journal of Management, Journal of
Management Studies, Management Science, Organization Science, Organization Studies, Research on
Organizational Behavior, Strategic Management Journal, and International Journal of Management
Reviews; Finance: The Journal of Finance, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Journal of
Financial Economics, and Review of Financial Studies; Economics: American Economic Review,
Industrial & Corporate Change, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Journal of Economic
Perspectives, and RAND Journal of Economics; Accounting: Accounting Review, Journal of Accounting




‘‘high tide’’ of turnaround publications, in response to the global financial crisis of
2008 and the years after.
The mean sample length is 11.59 years. Amburgey et al. (1993) study of the
Finish newspaper industry represents a clear outlier, with a sample length of
192 years, ranging from 1771 to 1963 and representing 1011 firms. The same can be
noted in the works of Kronborg and Thomsen (2009) as well as Tripsas (1997); the
first analyzes the survival of Danish corporations over the course of 110 years, and
the latter discusses technological changes in the US typesetting industry over
104 years. The mean sample size is 536.02, with the vast majority using firm-level
data. Figure 2 depicts the distributions of sample size, length, and publication lag.
Of the publications that disclose their sample characteristics, 154 studies have

























Fig. 1 Research articles on corporate distress and turnaround by research field
2.5% maximum outliers are dismissed from descriptive statistics.
Sample Size Sample Length Publication Lag
Mean Median Mode SD
536.02 164 1 1,023.26
Kurtosis Skewness Min/Max Jarque-B.
12.65 3.31 1/7,114 1,353.29
Mean Median Mode SD
11.59 9 6 10.12
Mean Median Mode SD
7.62 7 7 3.71
Kurtosis Skewness Min/Max Jarque-B.
11.40 2.82 0/83 882.81
Kurtosis Skewness Min/Max Jarque-B.
0.33 0.76 0/18 86.39
Fig. 2 Histograms of sample characteristics
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markets, of which the UK represents the majority, with 14 single-country studies.
This is followed by six German and three Swedish samples. Asia accounts for a total
of 14 studies, focusing primarily on Japan (6 publications). Only ten articles handle
samples of more than ten countries (Acharya and Subramanian 2009; Atanassov and
Kim 2009; Faccio et al. 2006; Lel and Miller 2008; Lin et al. 2006; Lins et al. 2013;
McDonald and Westphal 2003; Sarkar et al. 2006; Tong and Wei 2011; van
Witteloostuijn 1998). The overall distribution of regional focus indicates a clear
Anglo-American bias of empirical research on the topic, independent of the research
field.
2 The framework of corporate turnaround
The second step after the extensive literature search comprises coding and
structuring the identified body of research (Haleblian et al. 2009). The 276 works
are coded by research field, method (empirical versus case study or conceptual),
dependent variables, sample characteristics, type of origin, potential mediators or
moderators, and key findings. The latter three lay the foundation for a detailed
categorization of the respective work into a theoretical framework (cf. Fig. 3). This
structuring is based on an integration of corporate change frameworks into
organizational turnaround research to account for the various facets of activities a
firm undergoes when attempting to avoid default. Consequently, the framework











































Turnaround Success Measurements 
Fig. 3 Turnaround under corporate distress—research framework
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commonly used to classify turnaround actions (DeWitt 1993; Domadenik et al.
2008; Lim et al. 2013).
The theoretical framework is developed based on organizational change theory,
which can generally be divided into content, process, and context research. This
yields a holistic framework, with the ‘‘what’’ of change summarized under content,
the ‘‘why’’ of change defined as inner and outer context, and the ‘‘how’’ accounting
for the organizational change process (Armenakis and Bedeian 1999; Castrogio-
vanni and Bruton 2000; Pettigrew 1987). The framework accounts for the many
success measures employed across different research fields with an outcome
dimension, which provides a basis for an effective consolidation of the empirical
results generated by different research fields.
Based on organizational theory, content research analyzes the different strategies
and activities conducted during turnaround. The taxonomy of content is further
detailed based on dimensions common to corporate restructuring research to
partially account for the severely differing natures of actions. Hence, classifications
are made according to ‘‘portfolio restructuring,’’ ‘‘financial restructuring,’’ and
‘‘operational restructuring’’ (Eichner 2010). Portfolio restructuring can be under-
stood as a severe change in a firm’s asset structure, by either investing or divesting
in divisions, plants, and business units (Bowman and Singh 1993). Financial
restructuring includes alterations of a firm’s capital structure and financing behavior
(Sudarsanam and Lai 2001). As operational restructuring still serves as an umbrella
for a myriad of activities targeting efficiency enhancements, more recent
publications suggest a detached category, including forced managerial and top
management team replacements (Eichner 2010; Sudarsanam and Lai 2001).
Although some categories are based on corporate restructuring research, they are
equally important for turnaround during organizational distress, as successfully
avoiding default inevitably incorporates far-reaching change (Eichner 2010).
Publications analyzing the different turnaround stages and timing are summa-
rized under the framework’s process dimension. However, the sequencing has not
been consistently institutionalized within turnaround research until now. Robbins
and Pearce (1993) adapt Bibeault’s (1982) five-step approach and define four steps,
which began with the turnaround situation, retrenchment response, recovery
response, and turnaround success, with the retrenchment and recovery phases as the
relevant implementation phases (Eichner 2010). Filatotchev and Toms (2006)
extend this two-stage turnaround with a ‘‘realignment’’ stage. Pearce (2007) offers
another definition, with a three-phase model including ‘‘decline,’’ ‘‘redirection,’’ and
‘‘reestablishment.’’ Consequently, Smith and Graves (2005) illustrate the lack of
consensus between researchers regarding what constitutes a turnaround situation, or
turnaround success, with respect to timing. As the framework used in the article at
hand focuses on turnaround strategies’ implementation, the process dimension is
subdivided into ‘‘retrenchment’’ and ‘‘recovery’’ (Barker and Duhaime 1997). The
former comprised decline-stemming strategies to impede or even reverse decline’’,
and the latter encompasses growth-oriented strategies that target profitability and
sustainable growth (Arogyaswamy et al. 1995; Freeman and Cameron 1993;
Robbins and Pearce 1992).
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Although Bibeault (1982) initially stated that turnaround time is a function of the
organization’s size, thus linking process to context, Hoffman (1989) postulates that
only 2 of the 17 studies investigated in his paper analyze whether the causes were
statistically associated with downturn. This is unexpected, as numerous influential
works state the importance of considering the root cause when determining the
reaction to decline (Castrogiovanni and Bruton 2000; Hofer 1980; Pearce and
Operational Managerial Portfolio Financial
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Fig. 4 Literature overview according to the framework
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Michael 2006; Schendel et al. 1976). However, both the initial cause of decline, as
argued by Hofer (1980), and internal organizational and external environmental
factors, such as the stage in the product’s life cycle, competitive position, and
industry type, must be addressed (O’Neill 1986).
Further, the question of distress and successful turnaround measurement must be
accounted for and is thus integrated into the framework. The subsequent detailing of
the derived framework dimensions is based on the categorization of the 262 works
as described in the preceding section. Figure 4 provides an overview of the
reviewed publications.
3 Turnaround content
The myriad of strategies related to a firm’s survival can be clustered into four
categories: operational, managerial, portfolio, and financial restructuring. Each
category offers numerous subsets of turnaround moves (Lai and Sudarsanam 1997).
3.1 Operational restructuring
Operational restructuring focuses on operating efficiency that does not target
corporate strategy. In the context of corporate distress, operating actions refer to
‘‘doing things right’’, whereas strategic moves can be classified as ‘‘doing the right
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things’’ (Hofer 1980). However, not all actions undertaken are observable for
researchers (Eichner 2010). For instance, the interdependencies between individual
actions significantly contribute to variance explanations in operating performance,
but are hardly visible (Yawson 2005, 2009). This may offer a feasible explanation
for mixed results, despite the broad conceptual support (Holder-Webb et al. 2005).
Over 40% of firms that file for Chapter 11 experience operating losses in the 3 years
following bankruptcy, with one-third reentering bankruptcy or private debt restruc-
turing (Hotchkiss 1995). This yields less than 10% successful turnaround cases
(Moulton and Thomas 1993). The fact that a majority of firms undertaking operational
restructuring efforts require further restructuring indicates a potential bias toward
unprofitable firms’ continuation (Acharya et al. 2007; Hotchkiss 1995; Routledge and
Gadenne 2000). An explanation lies within the technicalities of bankruptcy law in the
USA. As an inefficient firm that files for Chapter 11 bankruptcy is allowed to continue
operating in the same line of obviously unprofitable business before liquidation,
operational and thus nonstrategic reorganization is offered to the firm as an alternative
to potential default (Campbell 1996; White 1989); both equity holders and creditors
prefer this unnatural closing alternative. The former favor continuation to preserve
their interests in the company, while the latter calculate the potential future returns
versus liquidation outcomes (Routledge and Gadenne 2000). Hence, as Azoulay and
Shane (2001) conclude, a firm’s choice regarding continuation is largely influenced by
stakeholders’ contractual frameworks and emphasizes the importance of accounting
for institutional context in turnaround research.
The partially contradictory results indicate the need to analyze the myriad of
operational restructuring moves in more detailed subgroups. Four exhaustive
subcategories are deployed to account for the breadth of potential operational
restructuring moves, allowing for both efficiency-oriented and growth-fostering
actions. Operational restructuring moves, based on Sudarsanam and Lai’s (2001)
operational restructuring classifications, can either alter an organization’s existing
processes, adjust product and service offerings as well as related sales activities, or
address changes in operating assets or underlying capital structures (Sudarsanam
and Lai 2001). Further, as reducing staff might significantly contribute to efficiency
improvements or cost reductions, another important subcategory consists of
operational restructuring moves that address a firm’s human capital. These
subcategories clearly differ from more strategically oriented moves, for instance
the organizational restructuring as summarized by Bowman and Singh (1993),
which includes more severe measures, such as acquisitions.
3.1.1 Organizational processes
Although conceptual works identify organizational process changes as a key
element of operational turnaround, this has been largely neglected in empirical
studies, primarily due to the difficulties in observing and quantifying process
alterations from an external perspective. Altering production processes proved to be
an effective instrument when facing corporate decline, and especially under the
contingency of environmental changes (Robins 1993). However, not all processes
are retrenchment oriented; Cefis and Marsili (2005) emphasize that growth-oriented
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process innovations particularly have a strong effect on survival chances. Early
implementation is critical to account for a potential lag regarding process renewal
and turnaround effects (Sinha and Noble 2008). Thus, organizational process
restructuring is most effective when implemented during the retrenchment phase of
corporate turnaround, even when defined as stabilizing and growth oriented
(Eichner 2010). Longitudinal research and the deployment of survey techniques in
future studies could add empirical evidence to existing conceptual works and thus
address the difficulties in observability and external measurement (Bititci et al.
2012). Further examples include DeWitt et al.’s (1998) study, which analyzes
feedback from 699 employee surveys, or Elliott and Smith’s (2006) survey-based
investigation of crisis situations in the UK’s soccer industry.
3.1.2 Product and sales
The likelihood of corporate default depends on the product’s life cycle stage,
primarily explained by continuous technological advancements and intensifying
competition among mature products (Agarwal and Gort 2002; Agarwal et al. 2002).
An overly specialized product offering can cause or accelerate corporate distress
(Opler and Titman 1994). Thus, the improvement of product propositions through
variety enhancements or innovation significantly fosters survival chances. However,
Cottrell and Nault (2004) find that pure extensions to existing products are
counterproductive, and even hinder operating performance. Therefore, innovation
plays a critical role during corporate distress, enabling firms to charge an innovation
premium (Cefis and Marsili 2005; Ketchen and Palmer 1999).
3.1.3 Human capital
Management literature provides a majority of work on human capital strategies
within turnaround research (McKinley 1993). Numerous studies and full reviews
have been recently published regarding various subjects including downsizing, such
as Datta et al.’s (2010) extensive review. However, not all works directly relate to a
distinct organizational turnaround context. For instance, Wayhan and Werner
(2000) demonstrate the positive effect of layoffs on subsequent financial perfor-
mance, independent of the company’s current health. Hence, downsizing studies’
results must be compared with caution when analyzing their effects on turnaround
outcome. Additional alternatives to address default include pure workforce
reduction to increase the revenue per employee and decrease costs, as well as
resorting to low-cost country workers or introducing flexible employment models
(Taplin and Winterton 1995).
Organizational change theory demonstrates the conflict that lays the foundation
for employee downsizing literature during corporate distress: while such organi-
zational factors as distress yield a need to lay off employees, institutional context
factors, such as governments, unions, or domestic ownership, create social and
institutional pressures that hinder downsizing (Alakent and Lee 2010; Shane and
Foo 1999). An additional challenge arises from the difficulty in operationalizing
employee downsizing (Datta et al. 2010). Many scholars reference an individually
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defined percentage of a reduction in overall headcount as a threshold for human
capital restructuring (Datta et al. 2010; Eichner 2010).
Consequently, studies on workforce restructuring during corporate distress offer
contradictory results. John et al. (1992) and Chowdhury and Lang (1996) state that
layoffs are the largest contributors to cost savings during the course of operational
restructuring and significantly increase the likelihood of survival. However,
downsizing used as an ad hoc measure solely to reduce costs may hinder the full
potential of human capital restructuring, regardless of its use as a measure to
increase efficiency, or as a turnaround move (Freeman and Cameron 1993).
Nevertheless, downsizing is often used in an attempt to immediately reduce costs
and regain liquidity (Budros 1999; Folger and Skarlicki 1998; Norman et al. 2013).
Although spontaneous layoffs during retrenchment may decrease costs in the short
term, downsizing is more effective when used during the recovery and stabilization
phase of a turnaround (Love and Nohria 2005).
Conversely, many studies underpin downsizing’s possible negative effects; for
instance, it might decrease creativity among employees and negatively impacts
survivors’ commitment, known as ‘‘survivorship syndrome’’ (Amabile and Conti 1999;
Brockner et al. 2004). Further, downsizing negatively affects firm reputation from an
institutional perspective (Flanagan and O’Shaughnessy 2005; Love and Kraatz 2009).
These negative implications are more severe with high research and development and
capital intensities, or if a recession prevails (Guthrie and Datta 2008; Lin et al. 2008).
Nixon et al. (2004) and Hannan et al. (2006) state that downsizing negatively affects
market returns, as explained by the significant loss of intellectual capital.
However, these risks are moderated by the implementation process and overall
turnaround context. For instance, Martin et al. (1995) find that employee
commitment is significantly enhanced when the staff is involved during downsizing.
Outplacement programs and ensuring objectivity and ethical procedures addition-
ally foster commitment (DeWitt 1998; DeWitt et al. 1998; Elliott and Smith 2006;
Love and Nohria 2005; Ludwig 1993; Nixon et al. 2004). This can subsequently
trigger positive financial performance after layoffs (Chadwick et al. 2004; Reilly
et al. 1993; Trevor and Nyberg 2008).
3.1.4 Capital expenditures
Within the boundaries of operational restructuring during corporate distress, capital
expenditure (CAPEX) alterations enhance operating efficiency with existing
resources and do not include fundamental strategic changes in assets that are
summarized under portfolio restructuring.
CAPEX changes are relatively easy to implement and often demonstrate direct
results, as short-term budget allocations can be employed as a primary lever to
control expenditures. Consequently, operational restructuring is twofold through
CAPEX alterations (Eichner 2010). During the retrenchment phase, CAPEX
reductions can effectively lessen financial tightening, and during the stabilization
phase, CAPEX increases rejuvenate assets’ productivity (Schendel et al. 1976).
However, empirical results remain inconclusive; Andrade and Kaplan (1998) state
that CAPEX reductions are inevitable for firms in distress, and Sudarsanam and Lai
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(2001) cannot find any significant influence. Moreover, Furrer et al. (2007) postulate
that CAPEX negatively relates to market performance in the years immediately
after a turnaround, and only reveals positive effects in subsequent mid-term years.
Hence, significant performance enhancement can be expected only if accompanied
by strategic asset retrenchment or portfolio restructuring (Lins et al. 2013; Pearce
and Robbins 1993). Further, firms in distress often cannot increase CAPEX due to
immediate cash flow constraints. During the 2008 financial crisis, 86% of CFOs in a
sample of distressed US firms declared an inability to invest in attractive projects
due to financial constraints (Campello et al. 2010). Thus, as D’Aveni (1989)
summarizes, reductions in CAPEX alone may buy time, but do not securely ensure
turnaround.
3.2 Management replacements
The theoretical foundation of CEO replacement is linked to agency theory, which
analyzes the alignment of interests between top management as agents, and
stockholders and creditors as principals (Barker et al. 2001).
3.2.1 CEO exchange
From a behavioral theory perspective, CEO dismissal during corporate distress
circumvents a ‘‘threat-rigidity response’’ in the face of distress (Daily and Dalton
1995; Tushman and Rosenkopf 1996). Strategy innovation is a critical success
factor during turnaround, highly dependent on the CEO’s intrinsic beliefs in this
opportunity, thus making a change in leadership inevitable (Stopford and Baden-
Fuller 1990).
Consequently, researchers initially conceptualized CEO replacement as an
integral part of every turnaround effort (Bibeault 1982; Boeker 1997; Hofer 1980).
The ability to make critical choices implies an overidentification risk regarding the
organization and its current strategy; this makes organizational failure a personal
defeat, escalating a commitment to a failing strategy (Clapham et al. 2005).
Accordingly, Whitaker (1999) states that more firms enter financial distress as a
result of mismanagement than economic distress.
Nevertheless, agency costs can also be reduced by aligning management action with
shareholder interests by significantly reducing the income of CEOs who remain in the
distressedfirm(Gilson andVetsuypens1993).Thus,manager replacement is a common,
but unessential element of a successful turnaround (Claphamet al. 2005;Mackey 2008).
Gilson and Vetsuypens (1993) report that 33% of all CEOs are replaced during
turnaround efforts. However, legal contingencies must be accounted for.
Barker et al. (2001) conclude that little systematic evidence exists to prove that
replacements lead to organizational change during corporate distress. Chen and
Hambrick (2012) and Daily and Dalton (1995) posit that CEO replacement has no
effect on turnaround likelihood. Unless the preceding share performance is
extremely good or bad, CEO replacement seems to have no significant explanatory
power (Warner et al. 1988). These findings might be an effect of firms’ late reaction
to facing default. While decline can be detected as early as 10 years prior to
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bankruptcy, management is not replaced until immediate corporate distress
(Hambrick and D’Aveni 1992). As a consequence, it becomes increasingly difficult
to save the already half-sunken ship.
However,Elloumi andGueyie´ (2001) contradict this, suggesting that the composition
of human capital explains distress beyond an exclusive reliance on financial indicators.
Furthermore, event studies by Weisbach (1988) and Davidson et al. (1993) support
positive stock price reactions ondayswhen resignations are announced.Bankruptcy law
in the USA allows for the incumbent’s continued engagement, while Swedish
bankruptcy filings automatically terminate the CEO’s employment and yield the firm’s
auction. Thus, differences in institutional contexts lead to diverse conclusions regarding
exchanges in top management (Espen and Thorburn 2003, 2008).
However, these inconclusive results cannot be solely attributed to legal
contingencies. Various scholars empirically support management replacements by
stating that a CEO’s forced resignation is preceded by significant declines in
operating performance and is followed by substantial performance improvements
(Denis and Denis 1995b; Yawson 2009). Newer studies examine not only the CEO’s
disengagement, but also the relationship between the ex-leader and the firm. The
findings underpin the need for a clear-cut: if the fired CEO remains as a member of
the board, the successor cannot implement true strategic change (Filatotchev et al.
2000; Quigley and Hambrick 2012).
3.2.2 Top management team exchange
Limiting analyses to CEOs will not fully capture management succession’s impact
on performance (Lohrke et al. 2004; Shen and Cannella 2002). Siggelkow and
Rivkin (2005) argue that the second hierarchy level’s power must not be
underestimated. Mueller and Barker (1997) support this by discovering a significant
negative relationship between the proportions of pre-decline top managers
remaining in the firm and turnaround.
Some scholars question management replacements in principle, as terminated
managers experience significant personal costs after forced replacement (e.g., no
employment in listed firms for at least 3 years). Thus, a distressed firm’s managers
have incentives to increase performance (Espen and Thorburn 2003; Gilson 1989).
Moreover, newer work more closely examines the possible influences of
contingency effects. The root cause of corporate decline might significantly
moderate the stock market performance effects from management replacement. On
the one hand, management retention yields credibility and, thus, positive market
returns during uncontrollable external causes, such as political changes or industry
decline (Eisfeldt and Kuhnen 2013). On the other hand, the effect of CEO
replacement as a reaction to internal turmoil is moderated by various effects and is
not directly linked to performance (Dowell et al. 2011; Fredrickson et al. 1988).
3.2.3 Board of directors
Studies on corporate governance might further explain the inconclusive results on
managerial replacements (Westphal and Bednar 2005). Inside directors strongly
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depend on the CEO, whereas external directors can initiate turnaround activities
when other governance mechanisms fail (Daily 1996; Johnson et al. 1993). Further,
outsiders increase the board’s diversity (Filatotchev and Toms 2003). They can
provide additional expertise, regaining trust of creditors and shareholders (Daily
1996). Multiple studies offer empirical evidence by depicting a strong correlation
between the number of outside directors and survival chances (Barker et al. 2001;
Daily 1995; Daily and Dalton 1994a; Hoskisson et al. 1994; Mueller and Barker
1997). However, various works contradict this by reporting that bankrupt firms do
not have fewer independent directors than surviving firms (Daily and Dalton 1994b;
Elloumi and Gueyie´ 2001).
Blockholders further extend this framework by significantly influencing
management replacements’ effectiveness by increasing the likelihood of CEO
turnover. Hence, surviving companies tend to have larger institutional investors
(Filatotchev and Toms 2003; Kang and Shivdasani 1997). However, Jostarndt and
Sautner (2008) cannot find a correlation between ownership concentration and
managerial replacement likelihood during distress.
A different research strand argues that top managers’ personal characteristics
have the greatest impact on managerial replacement success during distress (Boeker
1997; Hall 1994; Ling et al. 2007). Chen and Hambrick (2012) state that merely
firing the CEO does not guarantee turnaround; rather, the key determinant is the
installation of a leader with attributes more suited to successfully develop and
implement turnaround strategies. Firms that are less prone to experiencing corporate
default have top management teams with higher functional heterogeneity and
education levels, shorter organizational tenures, and more tenure heterogeneity
(Greening and Johnson 1996; Hall 1994). Further, CEOs with high opportunity costs
are more likely to assume higher risks and more rapidly fail (Arora and Nandkumar
2011). Additionally, a CEO’s social network ties determine his response to decline
due to a herding bias (McDonald and Westphal 2003). Celebrity CEOs tend to
produce excess stakeholder expectations, subsequently leading to failure (Sinha
et al. 2012).
Further, more positive market returns are achieved for external successors
than internal ones, and especially after bankruptcy (Davidson et al. 1993).
However, these results seem to be limited to the private sector, as Boyne and
Meier (2009) find that turnaround is more likely to be achieved by insiders than
outsiders in the context of superintendent exchange in declining school districts.
Additionally, Hannan et al. (2006) and Khanna and Poulsen (1995) find no
positive correlation between the appointment of outside successors and survival
likelihood.
The mixed effects of management’s replacement during distress lead to the
conclusion that they are heavily contingent on contextual factors. The high rate of
CEO exchange during distress contrasts with only a partially positive impact and
draws the assumption that managers often serve as scapegoats, without actual




Portfolio restructuring contrasts operational restructuring by focusing on a
strategically motivated alteration of a company’s portfolio. While the first targets
liquidity or efficiency improvements, the latter aims to refocus the business.
Corporate distress researchers agree that refocus is an integral component during
turnaround (Gibbs 1993; Hoskisson et al. 2004; Lasfer et al. 1996; O’Neill 1986).
From an agency perspective, portfolio restructuring reduces information asymme-
tries between equity holders and managers by transferring assets to the capital
market (Bergh et al. 2008; Gibbs 1993; Li 2013).
Hoskisson et al. (2004) indicate that a reorientation toward a peer group of
businesses enables the distressed firm to access additional resources and soften
potential harm from intensified competition or legislative changes. However, if the
portfolio restructuring moves are too broad, their impact on performance diminishes
(Brauer 2006). Greening and Johnson (1996) state that firms with top management’s
energy and attention solely concentrated on managing a complex, excessively
diverse portfolio restructuring may lack the time to handle daily business, thus
increasing the likelihood of default.
Empirical evidence based on broad conceptual support is strong. For instance,
refocusing announcements are associated with significant positive market reactions
after performance declines (Denis and Kruse 2000; Markides 1992), as markets
interpret the refocusing as a step toward reducing financial distress costs (Berger
and Ofek 1999; Lasfer et al. 1996). However, if corporate decline is already critical,
increasing financial constraints might decrease the ability to act (Dawley et al.
2002).
3.3.1 Divestments
Cost retrenchment under operational restructuring has only limited influence, and is
often insufficient to achieve turnaround alone. A significant increase in the
likelihood of survival is probable only in combination with strategic asset
retrenchment, as pre-distress diversification levels are often too high (Asquith et al.
1994; Denis and Rodgers 2007; Li and Tallman 2011; Markides 1992; Robbins and
Pearce 1992). This positive effect is primarily due to reduced leverage and an
increased focus on core competencies, as well as the productivity growth achieved
by divestitures of less productive plants (Denis and Kruse 2000; Denis and Shome
2005; Hakkala 2006; Markides 1995). Nevertheless, empirical analyses by Lamont
et al. (1994) suggest that excessively rigorous divestment can hinder recovery.
Although Cusatis et al. (1993) support portfolio restructuring’s positive effects by
finding positive and abnormal returns, Winn (1997) states that strategic asset
reduction does not turn around asset productivity, as highly distressed firms often
sell off their most lucrative and often strategically important assets below value to
increase cash (Andrade and Kaplan 1998; Campello et al. 2010). Additionally,
markets might negatively react as a substantial power shift occurs during corporate
distress, from equity holders to creditors (Li 2013). Thus, creditors influence
divestiture decisions and obtain the majority of asset sale proceedings instead of
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reinvesting them into the firm. Thus, investors’ return on assets diminishes (Brown
et al. 1993). Brauer (2006) has more extensively reviewed divestures in his work
titled: ‘‘What Have We Acquired and What Should We Acquire in Divestiture
Research? A Review and Research Agenda.’’
3.3.2 Investments
A sole focus on decreases in assets leads to a one-sided strategy that lacks sufficient
leverage and makes the firm more prone to crises (Sheaffer and Mano-Negrin 2003).
Dahiya et al. (2003) highlight the possibility of debtor-in-possession financing. This
type of secured financing for firms under Chapter 11 bankruptcy enables
investments, thus increasing firms’ chances for survival. Acquiring new resources
positively affects firms’ recovery (Morrow et al. 2007; Smith and Graves 2005; Wu
2013). However, the positive effect is limited to true investments. Refocusing
strategies that contain only alliances or joint ventures are not found to yield positive
returns (Morrow et al. 2007). Furthermore, Wan and Yiu (2009) note that
acquisitions are the most effective during environmental turmoil, with only limited
effects in stable contexts.
3.4 Financial restructuring
One primary contribution of the review at hand is the consideration of various
research fields. This review employs a broad definition to capture the entire breadth
of research on financial restructuring during turnaround, including all alterations of
a firm’s capital structure. Possible alterations in a turnaround context can be
generally classified as having objectives of either debt restructuring or liquidity
improvement (John 1993). Liquidity improvements include working capital
optimization, dividend cuts, or equity issuance, but debt restructuring comprises
debt provisions, reduction, and structural changes, as well as balance sheet cleanups
(Eichner 2010; Opler 1993). Working capital restructuring does not include
alterations of production processes, included in operational restructuring, to ensure
conceptual rigor. Hence, primary levers of this type of financial restructuring in the
context of corporate distress include inventory management, stretching payables,
and optimizing receivables (Eichner 2010).
The costs of distress are significant from a financial perspective; thus,
corporations are motivated to avoid bankruptcy filings through private financial
reorganization (Franks and Torous 1994). Although the actual amount of financial
distress cost varies, scholars agree on its significance and impact on the likelihood
of turnaround. Wruck (1990) reports an average direct distress cost of 3.5% of
market value and indirect costs of 9–15%. Andrade and Kaplan (1998) find slightly
higher distress costs of 10% to 20% for US firms, and Almeida and Philippon (2007)
calculate a net present value of distress of 4.5% of pre-distress value. Gilson et al.
(1990) find that 50% of distressed firms successfully employ private financial
restructuring during distress. Franks and Torous (1994) state that creditors’ recovery
rates are significantly higher under private reorganization than during bankruptcy
filings. However, firms with potentially higher bankruptcy costs, such as small firms
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or those with low asset tangibility, are biased toward choosing capital structures
with higher inherent bankruptcy risks (Hovakimian et al. 2012). Nevertheless,
Bowman et al. (1999) note that financial restructuring is the most effective means of
achieving turnaround. Moreover, Yawson (2005) compares financial restructuring to
other instruments to emphasize financial reorganization’s immediate effects,
compared to portfolio restructuring’s lagged impacts on performance.
3.4.1 Debt restructuring
Finance theorists argue that overleverage is commonly a primary cause of distress
(Molina 2005). Equity allows a firm to share aggregate risks with creditors,
minimizing the vulnerability in distress during downturns (Gertler and Hubbard
1993). However, this tax shield creates a bias against equity (Asquith et al. 1994;
Berk et al. 2010). Thus, and as Wruck (1990) summarizes, a reduction in leverage
avoids distress, but does not maximize value. This is especially the case when
considering Elkamhi et al.’s (2012) findings, which state that these costs cannot
offset the tax shield of debt.
Nevertheless, numerous works underpin the positive effects of leverage reduction
(Kahl 2002; Lin et al. 2008; Opler and Titman 1994; Sheppard 1994). Zingales
(1998) argues that high leverage reduces survival chances by curtailing investments,
and Giroud et al. (2012) find significant performance improvements after debt
reductions. However, Winn (1997) contradicts these findings and does not find any
asset productivity growth due to debt reduction during turnaround. Kalay et al.
(2007) further state that firms with higher debt ratios experience greater operating
performance improvements. Consequently, George and Hwang (2010) and Rout-
ledge and Gadenne (2000) conclude that companies experiencing successful
turnaround are more highly leveraged. The findings’ significant conflict might be
somewhat due to contextual factors, such as industrial turmoil, aside from different
model specifications and partially congruent research objectives. Campello et al.
(2011) state that renegotiating credit lines during financial restructuring is a crucial
determinant of turnaround success, and particularly when the overall economy is in
decline. However, banks’ willingness to renegotiate strongly depends on such
macroeconomic factors as upcoming recessions.
Various scholars in the finance research field supplement their research on the
absolute level of debt by offering work on the composition of debt as an additional
substream of research on financial restructuring during distress (Gennaioli and Rossi
2013). Asquith et al. (1994) and James (1996) note that debt composition is equally
important for turnaround. Resorting to agency theory, Brown et al. (1993) state that
the power shift from equity holders to creditors implies that the restructuring firm
offers equity to private lenders and senior debt to public debt holders, leading to
positive market reactions. Thus, debt covenants can act as an effective disciplinary
mechanism during distress (DeAngelo et al. 2002). However, management and
shareholders often counteract by trying to diminish creditors’ increase in power;
managers and owners choose investment projects with lower net present values
during distress to force creditors to accept poorer terms in private debt
renegotiations, generating greater returns to shareholders in states of solvency
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(Bernardo and Talley 1996). Creditors as residual claimants will inevitably agree to
concessions to avoid a costly liquidation, irrespective of a company’s state of
distress (Mella-Barral 1999; Noe and Wang 2000; Routledge and Gadenne 2000).
Thus, the decision to default can even be understood as the distressed firm’s
endogenous response to anticipated foreclosure outcomes (Brown et al. 2006).
Transaction costs for private debt restructuring remain comparably high due to these
agency problems and limit the degree of debt structure alterations during distress
(Gilson 1997). This argument yields an incentive for default, as transaction costs are
significantly smaller.
3.4.2 Liquidity improvement
The regaining of sufficient liquidity is equally important as debt reduction and
reorganization to turnaround efforts (John 1993). For instance, stretching accounts
payable to improve liquidity is positively associated with turnaround (Chowdhury
and Lang 1996). Furthermore, dividend cuts are observed as an additional liquidity
improvement measure during distress. However, both conceptual and empirical
findings remain inconclusive. While a reduction in dividends may result in
immediate liquidity enhancements, the signaling effects to capital markets are
negative (Eichner 2010). Buschmann (2006) cannot discover a significant impact on
turnaround likelihood, and Sudarsanam and Lai (2001) even report slightly negative
results. However, empiricism is still scarce and must account for the single
occurrence of dividend cuts. Contrary to turnaround intuition, Castrogiovanni and
Bruton (2000) conclude that parent companies’ simple infusion of capital to
increase liquidity does not yield the desired outcomes, even worsening the
distressed firm’s operating performance.
The aforementioned findings suggest that contextual factors are particularly
important when analyzing liquidity improvements’ effects on turnaround success.
Scholars’ models do not always clearly distinguish a firm’s health, hence impeding
a summarization of the results between different studies. Additionally, a regional
legislative framework is particularly important relative to creditor protection rights.
4 Turnaround process
Research on the turnaround process primarily resorts to life cycle approaches from
the organizational change theory (Chowdhury 2002). Theorists argue that its effects
depend on proper timing within the organizational life cycle (Agarwal and Gort
2002; Amburgey et al. 1993). The procedural aspects of turnaround still lack solid
empirical proof, although they have been subject to conceptualization in many
studies, and works that explicitly analyze different turnaround process stages remain
underrepresented (Filatotchev and Toms 2006; Hoffman 1989; Pandit 2000;
Pettigrew 2012). Nevertheless, how to implement turnaround fundamentally
determines survival likelihoods (Bergh et al. 2008). Thus, turnaround content must
be accordingly adjusted to the distressed entity’s organizational process stage
(Barker and Mone 1994; Bibeault 1982).
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Nevertheless, definitions for turnaround stages’ quantity, duration, or sequencing
are hardly similar. However, various processmodels can be decomposed into principal
retrenchment and subsequent recovery phases (Eichner 2010). Despite the multitude
of preceding and adjacent stages offered in literature, studies analyzing turnaround
success focus onmeasurable implementation phases that can be summarized under the
aforementioned two stages. Consequently, turnaround activities under distress can be
divided as either ‘‘defensive’’ or ‘‘belt tightening,’’ and ‘‘strategic’’ or ‘‘stabilizing’’
(Arogyaswamy et al. 1995; DeWitt 1993; Domadenik et al. 2008; Hambrick and
Schecter 1983; Pearce and Robbins 1993). Further, the sense-making and commu-
nication strategy of distinct turnaround strategies depend on their respective process
stages during the crisis (Balogun and Johnson 2004; Maitlis and Sonenshein 2010;
Vaara et al. 2006). From a practitioner’s perspective, employing a turnaround process
framework enables the effective prioritization of change strategies.
4.1 Retrenchment
Bibeault (1982) refers to retrenchment-oriented actions as those to ‘‘stop the
bleeding,’’ and target short-term stability during distress. Activities with the highest
cash flow impacts should be chosen first during the retrenchment phase (Finkin 1985).
However, scholars still argue about their applicability and effectiveness, depending on
the context. While Robbins and Pearce (1992) conceptualize retrenchment as an
integral component of a successful recovery, Barker and Mone (1994) and
Castrogiovanni and Bruton (2000) argue that turnaround success is determined by
both an implementation approach and the contextual factors of retrenchment
strategies. Subsequently,Morrow et al. (2004) find industry conditions to significantly
determine retrenchment success, stating that cost retrenchment is only positively
related to improved performance in declining industries. Boyne and Meier (2009)
further question the applicability of retrenchment actions in public sectors with their
study on distressed school districts’ yielding adverse effects on survival rates.
Nevertheless, entering into a retrenchment phase as a reaction to corporate
decline seems inevitable (Robbins and Pearce 1993). Moreover, Barker and
Duhaime (1997) and Chowdhury and Lang (1996) find an increased likelihood of
survival if private firms enter retrenchment phases. However, the synergy between
retrenchment and recovery exceeds the effectiveness of solitary retrenchment moves
(Schmitt and Raisch 2013).
Regarding the retrenchment phase’s intensity, most researchers support the
implementation of severe cost-cutting actions during the initial turnaround phase.
Bruton et al. (2003) report a positive relationship between the magnitude of
implemented retrenchment strategies and firms’ survival. Furthermore, Denis and
Rodgers (2007) find that firms are more likely to emerge as going concerns if they
realize significant, severe asset and liability cuts during retrenchment. Lamont et al.
(1994) offer more restrained results by highlighting a possible trade-off, in that firms
with gradual turnaround moves recover faster, but with inferior post-distress
performance compared to those that employ severe and rapid structural change.
Sudarsanam and Lai (2001) contradict this by stating that managers in non-recovery
firms restructure more intensively, yet more ineffectively than turnaround firms.
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Regarding the retrenchment phase’s timing, scholars resort to the organizational
inertia concept as part of the threat-rigidity theory (Wicks 2001), as retrenching actions
should be initiated as soon as possible to ensure short-term stabilization (Jansen 2004;
Moulton and Thomas 1993; Sheppard 1994). Large firms are especially disposed to
organizational rigidity in the face of distress, as pre-distress inertia is already high
(Audia and Greve 2006; Rosenblatt et al. 1993). However, in the specific corporate
distress context, small firms that appear to bemore flexible in a stable environmentmay
become highly rigid as a result of low performance (Greve 2011). Van Witteloostuijn
(1998) argues that organizational inertia even increases survival chances, as this enables
firms to outlast their more rapidly moving competitors. Furthermore, organizations
attempting to employ retrenchment-orientedmoves as early as possible tend to increase
risk in the face of distress (Chattopadhyay et al. 2001;Miller and Chen 2004). Zajac and
Kraatz (1993) summarize this by positing that the pressure and ‘‘need to change’’
dominates the constraints of the ‘‘ability to change.’’
This high dependency on organizational and contextual factors may explain the
inconclusive results regarding the retrenchment phase’s timing and severity.
Independent of contextual arguments, Barker and Mone (1994) note that the primary
problem with analyzing retrenchment moves is the difficulty in distinguishing
between the activity as merely the consequence of a crisis, or if it was proactively
deployed as a deliberate turnaround strategy.
4.2 Recovery
A subsequent shift toward sustainable growth is necessary after securing short-term
stability through retrenchment (Pandit 2000). As recovery activities are based on
investments, organizational refocus, and growth, a certain liquidity is necessary;
hence, retrenchment might be an obligatory antecedent to an effective recovery phase
(Eichner 2010). Although a recovery phase’s importance subsequent to retrenchment
is conceptually established, the empirical white spot remains imminent. Hofer (1980)
has defined three turnaround strategies that can be summarized as a recovery phase,
stating that a successful turnaround either includes a product ormarket refocusing, or a
‘‘one-level’’ or ‘‘two-level’’ increase in market share; the latter comprises a 100 and
200% increase, respectively. Similarly, Finkin (1985) defines the ‘‘awakening’’ and
‘‘streamlining’’ as two out of the three primary turnaround phases.
One of the scarce empirical supports is offered by Sudarsanam and Lai (2001)
who discover that recovery firms adopt growth-oriented and market-focused
strategies, whereas non-recovery firms remain in the ‘‘fire-fighting’’ retrenchment
stage. Eichner (2010) states that innovations during the recovery phase are highly
effective in securing sustainable turnaround.
5 Turnaround context
Turnaround context, as summarized under the umbrella of contingency theory,
comprises factors that are exogenous to the immediate scope of managerial actions
(Pettigrew 1987). They are generally determined during the pre-distress phase to lay
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a comparable foundation for analyses. Ketchen et al. (1996) argue that context is an
important control item to explain performance variations in connection with content
and process. The current review expands Pettigrew’s (1987) framework, which
defines context as either of an internal or external nature, and adds the cause of
distress as a new third research dimension.
5.1 Underlying distress causes
Pandit (2000) classifies the distress cause as the most frequently researched context
factor, in his review of 47 turnaround studies prior to 1996. Winn (1993) enables a
systematic approach toward distress cause analysis by defining various types of
corporate deterioration and argues that each must be met with distinct turnaround
strategies. Asquith et al. (1994) and Giroud et al. (2012) divide crisis causation into
cash flowcomponents by distinguishing between such internal causes as high leverage
or weak operating performance, and such external causes as industry decline.
5.1.1 Internal distress causes
Firm-specific distress causes, such as high leverage, low operating profitability, or
overexpansion, fall under the managers’ potential influence and are thus often
observed as endogenous root causes. Various turnaround researchers argue that
these controllable factors contribute to avoiding default more than exogenous
factors (Francis and Desai 2005).
Regarding operating profitability, Hofer (1980) conceptualizes that firms
operating close to breaking even use retrenchment strategies to achieve turnaround,
whereas firms operating far below this point should employ portfolio restructuring
and revenue-increasing actions. Furthermore, if operational profitability problems
are technology based, a turnaround strategy must be chosen accordingly, as this
distinctly differs from mere cost cutting (Lin et al. 2006).
The finance research field offers the majority of publications on overleveraging
as a cause of crisis, finding positive correlations between the severity of financial
distress and default probability (Campbell et al. 2008; Ofek 1993; Pandit 2000;
Smith and Graves 2005). Campello et al. (2010) argue that firms with tight credit
constraints inevitably plan deeper retrenchments regarding technology and capital
investments, and are forced to lay off more staff, leading to an inability to achieve
long-term profitability after the immediate distress situation.
Although the factors determining internal distress causes are defined ex-ante,
researchers face endogeneity problems (Giroud et al. 2012). While high leverage
and underperformance are antecedents to corporate distress, they are often also
caused by decline and emerge as a result of turnaround efforts; hence, they cannot
be clearly stated as independent when developing a turnaround model.
5.1.2 Exogenous distress causes
Comprising factors that are not directly influenced by the firm’s management are
leaps in competition or sudden technology changes, industry conditions, or
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legislation changes, external distress causes are not directly influenced by the firm’s
management (Mellahi and Wilkinson 2004). Denis and Denis (1995a) conclude that
turnaround probability depends on unexpected macroeconomic, industry-wide
factors. Furthermore, Das et al. (2007) find that corporate defaults cluster over time.
The authors provide three explanations for this: (1) firms may be exposed to
common risk factors yielding correlated changes in default probabilities; (2) the
default of one firm may lead to a chain reactions, forcing rivals into distress; and (3)
legislators may learn from corporate defaults, leading to legal changes and
increasing rivals’ default probabilities. Tushman and Rosenkopf (1996) highlight
this importance by discovering that management replacement is positively
associated with post-turnaround performance, but significantly and negatively
associated with subsequent performance when industry turmoil is the cause of
distress.
A commonly researched exogenous cause of distress involves industry crisis.
Finance and managerial research scholars agree that distress is more likely to occur
during industry turmoil (Almeida and Philippon 2007; Ramanujam 1984). Campello
et al. (2011) argue that corporate credit lines decrease during an industry crisis,
leading to corporate distress, but Benmelech and Bergman (2011) find that a firm’s
default reduces other industry rivals’ collateral value, leading to a bankruptcy chain
reaction. The latter argue that oversupply of corporate assets due to multiple
portfolio restructurings leads to an industry-wide value reduction, and thus a
magnification of the crisis. Andrade and Kaplan (1998) pursue this argument by
concluding that economic shocks drive higher distress costs, significantly influenc-
ing the chosen strategy’s effectiveness. However, Moulton et al. (1996) and Knott
and Posen (2005) argue that distressed firms generate externalities that significantly
reduce industry-wide costs, eventually leading to beneficial economic effects.
Various turnaround moves yield inconclusive results, or even reverse effective-
ness, when explicitly accounting for exogenous distress causes (Mitchell and
Mulherin 1996). A prominent example involves Lin et al.’s (2008) study, which
discovers an increasing probability of default during recessions, in which companies
massively reduce their workforce or downsize large-scale assets, commonly
effective actions during a turnaround. Comparably, Loui and Smith (2006)
conceptualize management replacements as particularly counterproductive during
recessions, and similar results are found regarding portfolio restructuring. Wan and
Yiu (2009) state that corporate acquisitions during environmental crises more
positively relate to post-crisis performance than in periods either before or following
an industry crisis.
A lack of empirical research to compare various turnaround strategies, contingent
on root causes, becomes evident when summarizing the work on underlying distress
causes as contextual factors.
5.2 Microeconomic context
Factors describing firm-specific characteristics are summarized under a microeco-
nomic context. Thomas and Ramaswamy (1993) conclude that organizational context
is a pivotal determinant of organizational change. Moulton et al. (1996) further argue
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that firm effects dominate industry effects in explaining failure. Coucke et al. (2007)
find that age, labor intensity, profitability, and size are the most influential moderators
for turnaround actions’ effectiveness. Indro et al. (1999) note ownership structure as an
additional measurable context factor. Nevertheless, Lin et al. (2006) state that no
optimal mix of firm characteristics exists to securely deter default.
5.2.1 Size
Themost commonly included context variable is firm size, which some scholars claim
dominates all other turnaround likelihood factors (Greve 2011; Moulton and Thomas
1993; Robbins and Pearce 1993). The direction of this causality seems unambiguous,
with a positive correlation between firm size and survival chances (Agarwal et al.
2002; Ahmadjian and Robinson 2001; Kato 2010; Ramanujam 1984; Stoeberl et al.
1998). For instance, Campbell et al. (2008) find that Chapter 11 firms are on average
ten times smaller than surviving firms. However, Denis and Rodgers (2007) and Pant
(1991) argue that larger firms cannot reorganize as quickly as their smaller
counterparts under distress, thus having inferior chances of survival. D’Aveni
(1989) further generally questions the influence of size as a contextual factor. Some
scholars similarly emphasize an organization’s age as having significantly higher
variance explanation power than mere size (Cefis and Marsili 2005; Klepper 2002;
Thornhill and Amit 2003). However, this argument must be interpreted with caution,
as size and age as independent context variables are hardly immune to confounding.
5.2.2 Ownership
Ownership becomes an important moderator of turnaround moves’ effectiveness
with respect to information asymmetries and dispersed interests between stake-
holders and management during corporate distress (Mata and Portugal 2000).
Donoher (2004) and Lai and Sudarsanam (1997) find that ownership structure and
corporate governance highly influence the choice of recovery strategy. However,
empirical evidence remains mixed; Filatotchev and Toms (2003) and Geroski and
Gregg (1994) find that large institutional ownership is positively associated with
survival, but Mata and Portugal (2000) cannot find any significant effects.
The consideration of various ownership structures becomes highly relevant when
state-owned entities are analyzed. Scholars find significantly different turnaround
approaches and effects when comparing stock corporations, state-owned firms, and
privately held companies (Vicente-Lorente and Sua´rez-Gonza´lez 2007).
Further, works on domestic versus foreign ownerships emphasize the negative
effects of the latter. However, Mata and Portugal (2002) cannot report significant
differences in survival chances between domestic and foreign firms. Kronborg and
Thomsen (2009) further note a significant survival premium for non-domestic firms.
Possible explanations are offered by Vicente-Lorente and Sua´rez-Gonza´lez (2007),
who summarize that due to their cultural background, foreign firms are character-
ized by more heterogeneous downsizing behaviors compared to domestic market




Many additional underlying factors influence turnaround probability aside from the
two primary microeconomic context variables. For instance, Hovakimian et al.
(2012) state that lower asset tangibility positively relates to default risk, and Tong
and Wei (2011) offer similar results for the dependence on non-foreign direct
investments. Agarwal et al. (2002) reference the product life cycle theory and state
that the time of entrance into a product market significantly influences survival
chances, as mature phase entrants are considerably more prone to decline than early
and growth phase entrants. Similarly, Geroski et al. (2010) find a ‘‘founding effect,’’
summarizing that the founder’s educational background, current GDP growth, and
other firm characteristics at the time of founding impact the firm’s survival for
several years. Studies by Mutchler and Hopwood (1997) and Faccio et al. (2006)
offer softer factors, with the former emphasizing the explanatory power of news
reporting on the company’s default, and the latter positive associating a firm’s
political connections with turnaround likelihood.
The employed microeconomic context variables’ high diversity may explain the
contradictive empirical results, and especially when considering characteristics that
are difficult to operationalize, such as a firm’s culture; unobserved heterogeneity
among the bankruptcy models may yield mixed results.
5.3 Macroeconomic context
Silverman et al. (1997) argue that firm mortality is influenced by not only firm-
specific microeconomic contexts, but also industry-level attributes. Default risk
includes a systematic component from a conceptual perspective, aside from
company-specific idiosyncratic risk, which is contingent on macroeconomic factors
and causes spillover effects as well as industry-specific yet time-varying risk factors
(Giesecke and Kim 2011; Vassalou and Xing 2004).
Institutional legitimacy plays a prominent role in conceptualizing the corporate
reaction to decline and survival chances (Shane and Foo 1999). Operational
restructuring is often especially constrained by legitimacy problems (Ahmadjian
and Robinson 2001; Lynn and Rao 1995). Hence, Moulton and Thomas (1993)
conclude that turnaround activities are highly constrained by forces external to the
organization. Dawley et al. (2002) state that these macroeconomic constraints can
even yield default. Thus, different archetypes of environmental settings, such as
industry volatility, high environmental complexity, or a combination of both must be
considered (Siggelkow and Rivkin 2005). Consequently, manifold outer context
variables are discussed in turnaround research; a majority of works cover the
influence of legislation, industry, and regional characteristics.
5.3.1 Legislation
The statutory environment directly impacts a firm’s reaction to decline aside from
mere procedural variations in different legal settings (Mouly and Sankaran 2004).
For instance, Davydenko and Franks (2008) argue that a lack of creditor protection
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leads banks to adjust their lending practices and require more collateral, thus
increasing firms’ bankruptcy costs. Acharya and Subramanian (2009) similarly find
a positive association between debtor-friendly bankruptcy codes and the use of
innovation. When accounting for strong union laws combined with weak investor
protection, Atanassov and Kim (2009) identify alliances between workers and
managers who sell assets to prevent layoffs, even willingly risking further declines
in performance. Further, Lel and Miller (2008) state that firms from weak investor
protection regimes, which are cross-listed on US markets, have a greater likelihood
to employ CEO replacement as a means of turnaround.
5.3.2 Industry
Industry effects resorting to systematic default risk as a macroeconomic context are
highly significant in default prediction models (Chava and Jarrow 2004; Rosenblatt
and Mannheim 1996). Routledge and Gadenne (2000) empirically support that retail
companies fail considerably more often than firms from the manufacturing sector.
Similarly, Hancock et al. (2013) discover that layoffs’ effectiveness significantly
increases in manufacturing firms compared to other industries.
5.3.3 Region
Behavioral theorists argue that both industry characteristics and regional and
cultural influences impact the choice of turnaround strategy (Bruton et al. 2003).
However, as most studies base their results on samples from the USA, empirical
evidence remains scarce. Kang and Shivdasani (1997) and Hurry (1993) compare
turnaround moves in distressed firms in the USA with Japanese organizations and
find that the latter are less likely to downsize and the extent of layoffs is
significantly smaller than in US companies. Bruton et al. (2003) broaden the
analysis to East Asian companies in general and argue that cultural differences,
operationalized by the power of a firm’s owner managers and their relationship to
their colleagues, constrain the applicability of workforce reduction.
6 Turnaround outcome
Although most works on corporate turnaround operationalize both distress and
turnaround success, only a few studies deliberately discuss the theoretical grounding
and reasoning for the chosen measure (Winn 1993). However, our framework
accounts for the importance of correct success measurements, compares common
measures across research fields, and is supplemented by the meta-dimension of
turnaround outcome. As Eberhart et al. (1999) demonstrate, the choice of
performance metrics significantly determines the study results. The authors
compare their findings, measured in abnormal returns (AR), with previous studies
that resort to operating performance as a main measure. Furthermore, Holder-Webb
et al. (2005) indicate that operational restructuring’s positive AR result from market
expectations is a response to restructuring announcements. Hence, when controlling
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for these positive reactions, the authors conclude that operational restructuring does
not improve long-term performance.
Pandit (2000) identifies overreliance on accounting measures as a common
default in turnaround research. The differences in success measures become
apparent, and especially when comparing works from the fields of general
management and finance research. Moreover, the difference between accounting-
based and market-based measurements plays an important role when reviewing
studies on turnaround outcomes. Eberhart et al. (1999) find that market-based
measures yield positive abnormal returns after Chapter 11 bankruptcy for US firms,
a success measure primarily employed in the finance research field. However,
Hotchkiss (1995) offers contradictive results that employ accounting measures,
predominantly used in general management research. Although scholars rely on
market measures to argue that relative and absolute accounting measures can be
subject to managerial manipulation, the counterparty claims market measures are
biased by expectations (Eberhart et al. 1999; Franzen et al. 2007; Furrer et al. 2007).
Moreover, as Haleblian et al. (2009) advocate in their concluding remarks on
measurement issues in M&A research, short-term abnormal market returns lack the
crucial ability to measure value creation or destruction during implementation
phases; the same applies to corporate turnaround research. As emphasized during
the review of such operational restructuring moves as organizational process
restructuring, not all firm turnaround efforts are visible to outsiders. A detailed
analysis of the accounting metrics used reveals potential flaws in accounting-based
measurements. While cash flow shortfalls to cover debt payments are often used to
determine distress situations, the use of calculations employing earnings before
interest and tax minus CAPEX and interest payments imply the hazard of
misinterpreting firms’ CAPEX characteristics (Eichner 2010). Entities pursuing
substantial investments, and thus experiencing a significant yet punctual CAPEX
increase, might be classified as distressed under the aforementioned criteria, despite
offering healthy firm conditions (Pun and White 2005). Hence, operationalizing a
defined success measure directly influences research results.
However, recent research struggles to offer clear advancements on the subject.
For instance, Trahms et al. (2013) suggest a more detailed differentiation of
turnaround outcomes, introducing several distinct outcome categories: sharp-bend
recovery, premium M&A, simple recovery to moderate recovery, discounted M&A,
reorganization, and failure, but these fall short of operationalizing the different
categories. The differentiation between sharp-bend, simple, and moderate recoveries
might be especially difficult to determine.
A more qualitative approach toward measuring turnaround strategies’ effective-
ness might be suitable to overcome these shortcomings. Works from management
research especially offer alternative concepts of quantifying turnaround outcome.
For instance, Acharya and Subramanian (2009) use a firm’s number of patents and
R&D investments to indicate turnaround success. Love and Kraatz (2009) use
changes in reputation as an additional measure of turnover strategies’ effectiveness.
From the finance research field, Benmelech and Bergman (2011) use credit spread
differences during distress and turnaround as success indicators. While these
alternative turnaround outcome measurements provide additional advantageous
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insights into turnaround strategies’ true effects, they also imply a disadvantage of
low comparability.
Consequently, turnaround outcomes must always be compared by considering the
underlying research objective as well as the corresponding research field (Winn
1993). An additional challenge results from the myriad of definitions employed (Lai
and Sudarsanam 1997; Scherbaum and Meade 2013).
7 Future research agenda
This review’s holistic framework consolidates the current state of corporate
turnaround research. Hence, its primary contribution involves the consolidation and
critical discussion of findings across multiple research fields and the subsequent
identification of research gaps. Different research opportunities can be derived from
these white spots, as these and the resulting research opportunities are not intended
to be exhaustive, but rather should highlight the selected gaps within the framework.
However, the identified research opportunities represent gaps along all dimensions
of the research framework, addressing theoretical or conceptual shortcomings
regarding the turnaround content, process, and context. Thus, we follow Trahms
et al.’s (2013) or Haleblian et al.’s (2009) approach to derive a research agenda.
Table 1 clusters the identified research gaps along the framework’s primary
dimensions.
7.1 Content
7.1.1 Gap 1: Integration of lenses
As this review demonstrates, different theoretical lenses must be referenced to
account for the breadth of restructuring research. The turnaround actions embedded
in the framework draw from various and partially detached disciplines (Eichner
2010). However, as Pettigrew (2012) summarizes, no single move has sufficient
explanatory power when investigating organizational performance. Nevertheless,
the vast majority of works from the finance and management lens remain detached.
Haleblian et al. (2009) describe this phenomenon as emphasizing two sides of the
same coin without real integration, consequently resulting in a lack of integrated
findings.
This begins with an inconsistent use of the terminology. For instance, while the
majority of management research works refer to downsizing as a turnaround move,
such as through employee layoffs (Filatotchev et al. 2000), the same term used in
finance literature researches the effect of asset reductions on turnaround probability
(Denis and Denis 1995a). If the studies’ individual backgrounds are not considered,
a meta-analysis of downsizing efficiency inevitably yields spurious conclusions.
Further, as stated in the discussion on turnaround success definitions, using different
measures to determine the effect on turnaround likelihood for similar turnaround
strategies might again lead to incorrect results. Future research could best address
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Table 1 Research gaps and future research agenda
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this by emphasizing the investigation of interdependencies between moves from
different disciplines, following Francis and Desai’s (2005) example. The authors
offer a holistic view on turnaround strategies by accounting for different situational
settings in combination with restructuring moves. Hence, the resulting research
questions could include: ‘‘How do financial restructuring moves interplay with
operational restructuring content?’’, ‘‘How does portfolio restructuring influence
management replacement?’’, or ‘‘How would one control for the interdependencies
of restructuring strategies?’’
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7.1.2 Gap 2: Theoretical grounding
A second and partially related gap results from insufficient theoretical grounding
(Loui and Smith 2006). Restructuring work is commonly based on either agency
theory (Barker et al. 2001; Espen and Thorburn 2003; Gibbs 1993; Gilson 1989) or
organizational process theory (Chowdhury 2002;Ketchen and Palmer 1999; Pettigrew
1987, 2012), to name two prominent examples. However, various publications lack
solid theoretical grounding, or resort to concepts exclusive to the respective research
lens (Pandit 2000). Thus, as Pettigrew (2012) suggests, strong theoretical foundations
and explicit theory generation goals are required,whichwill enable scholars to employ
deductive research and a superior understanding of empirical findings. A further
possibility to address this eminent gap involves integrating newly emerging
disciplines, such as behavioral finance; a prominent example is Carmeli and
Sheaffer’s (2008)work on howorganizational learning from failure affects leadership.
The incorporation of alternative disciplines leads to a new spectrum of research
questions, such as: ‘‘Including the concept of behavioral irrationalities, what cognitive
biases can help explain threat-rigidity responses?’’ or ‘‘Is managerial restructuring
influenced by such behavioral anomalies as the CEO’s self-attribution bias?’’
7.1.3 Gap 3: Sample characteristics
The body of research on restructuring content reviewed in the current work is largely
subject to various sample biases. Aside from a large company bias, as identified by
Robbins and Pearce (1993) and Chowdhury and Lang (1996), manufacturing industries
are heavily overrepresented and most financial service industries are excluded (Chava
and Jarrow 2004). Although Shumway’s (2001) bankruptcy prediction model offers a
rare exception, the representation bias hinders a solid integration of findings. Zmijewski
(1984) describes two additional sample biases by highlighting potential choice-based
and selection biases, primarily due to limited data availability. Furthermore, as most
samples are heavily biased toward the USA, transferring these findings to other regions
is difficult (Bruton et al. 2003). This lack of an integrative data sample can be diminished
by employing more international samples and broadcasting the use of matched-pair
samples (Pettigrew 2012). This enables scholars to more deliberately control for
industry characteristics and make comparisons among regions. The following potential
research questions emerge by overcoming these common limits in sample character-
istics: ‘‘How are different restructuring strategies contingent on regional differences?’’,
‘‘Howdo the effects of different restructuringmovesdiffer betweenexternal and internal
crisis causes?’’, ‘‘How do restructuring behaviors and successes in the banking sector
differ compare to those in the manufacturing industry?’’
7.2 Process and context
7.2.1 Gap 4: Content–context–process interdependencies
Although a majority of more recent publications incorporate some form of context
contingency into their research, the various inconclusive findings disclosed in this
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review hint to a prevailing lack of comprehensive accounting for the interplay
between restructuring content, process, and context (Holder-Webb et al. 2005). As
Pettigrew (2012: 1309) summarizes, in his retrospective on organizational process
research, ‘‘the biggest challenges and pay-offs come from us attempting to carry out
process and outcome studies where there is an explicit attempt being made to
explain the determinants of outcome variation in context and process terms.’’
Researchers can address this gap by deliberately including time-variant process
variables in dynamic modeling and controlling for internal and external context
(Datta et al. 2010). Scholars can use a dynamic content–process–context framework
to better explain variations in restructuring efficiency and enhance turnaround
models. Possible research areas include the resolution of existing contradictions on
the effectiveness of managerial restructuring, portfolio divestment as a means of
portfolio restructuring, and debt restructuring as a part of financial restructuring.
7.2.2 Gap 5: Accounting for timing
An important gap becomes obvious when accounting for the fact that most empirical
corporate restructuring studies are only based on cross-sectional data. Pandit (2000)
concludes in his review that large longitudinal sample studies are scarce. This lack
of longitudinal restructuring research hinders scholars to effectively link restruc-
turing content to the process (Pettigrew 2012). Additionally, various scholars note a
lack of consistency regarding clearly defined restructuring time frames (Smith and
Graves 2005; Stopford and Baden-Fuller 1990). As Chowdhury (2002) points out
that allowing for a certain time span is critical, as most restructuring actions yield
lagged results. However, if the chosen time frame is too short, a specific move’s true
effects might be excluded, and if too broad, model noise rapidly increases.
Researchers could address this gap by resorting to dynamic panel data models,
enabling them to account for both firm-specific and industry-specific fixed effects,
as well as time-variant influences (Brauer 2006). The outcome variation could thus
be linked to distinct process patterns, increasing the turnaround models’ explanatory
power. The resulting research questions include: ‘‘Does post-bankruptcy perfor-
mance represent a firm’s final profitability, or is this an intermediate effect?’’, ‘‘How
long do individual turnaround moves’ impacts lag behind implementation?’’, and
‘‘When should an individual restructuring activity be best implemented to release its
full potential during the turnaround phase?’’
7.2.3 Gap 6: Recovery phase research
The restructuring process literature review revealed few works regarding recovery
phase turnaround. Although the conceptual grounding and theoretical justification of
this phase is solid, empirical publications that explicitly analyze recovery-oriented
restructuring moves remain rare (Eichner 2010). Moreover, Barker and Mone
(1994) describe the difficulty in disentangling explicit turnaround effects from pure
efficiency-enhancing moves in stable times, as this becomes especially problematic
when analyzing growth-oriented restructuring moves. However, the results funda-
mentally differ between the contexts of forced restructuring in the face of
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bankruptcy or voluntary reorganization (Love and Nohria 2005; Tushman and
Rosenkopf 1996). Scholars could address this research gap by comprehensively
controlling for inner contexts and broadening empirical turnaround models to
include recovery- and growth-oriented moves, such as innovation efforts. Various
research questions arise to account for this gap: ‘‘How do restructuring moves’
effectiveness differ when implemented in stable contexts, compared to distress
situations?’’, ‘‘How much variance explanation power do recovery-oriented
restructuring moves offer?’’, or ‘‘What interdependencies exist between retrench-
ment and recovery strategies?’’
7.3 Methodological issues
7.3.1 Gap 7: Consistent success metric
One explanation for the various empirical contradictions disclosed in this review
involves the underlying performance metrics and distress criteria used. As Winn
(1993) states, publications often lack a proper evaluation and theoretical grounding
of the metrics used to define distress and the subsequent turnaround success or
failure. Pandit (2000) identifies an overreliance on accounting measures to indicate
turnaround success as a common default in restructuring research. While Eberhart
et al. (1999) find that market-based measures yield positive abnormal returns after
Chapter 11 bankruptcy, Hotchkiss (1995) offers contradictive results that employ
accounting measures. Haleblian et al. (2009) conclude that in an M&A context,
short-term abnormal market returns may provide an efficient performance metric,
but they clearly lack the crucial ability to measure value creation or destruction
during implementation phases. The same problem exists in corporate restructuring
research. As already stressed during the review of operational restructuring moves,
not all firm efforts to achieve turnaround are visible to outsiders. However, Chava
and Jarrow (2004) postulate that accounting variables add little predictive power
when market measures are already included in bankruptcy analyses. As mentioned
previously, a detailed analysis of the accounting metrics used reveals the potential
flaws in accounting-based measurements, and, as such, entities experiencing
substantial investments and thus significant yet punctual CAPEX increases could be
classified as distressed, despite offering healthy firm conditions.
Scholars should address this eminent lack of conclusive measurements by
employing twofold restructuring models, including both accounting- and market-
based measures. For example, Shumway’s (2001) bankruptcy prediction model
accounts for past stock returns as well as corporate profitability. Moreover,
following Haleblian et al.’s (2009) argument, more precisely defining restructuring
success avoids misinterpretations and false generalizations in the empirical findings.
The development of a comprehensive matrix model, with research objectives as the
first dimension and available distress and outcome metrics as the second, would
provide additional clarification. Hence, this could offer a unified approach toward
measuring the effect of different restructuring activities. Researchers could interpret
restructuring effectiveness based on this twofold approach and the following
research questions: ‘‘How can firms incorporate the interplay between market
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expectations and financial performance into the turnaround strategy development
process?’’ or ‘‘How can corporate distress be effectively measured to account for
both internal and external contexts?’’
7.3.2 Gap 8: Enhancement of bankruptcy prediction models
Most of the reviewed empirical studies resort to a logistic regression analysis, which
Brauer (2006) argues cannot account for the dynamics of organizational restruc-
turing. Although notable methodological developments have been realized when
using Altman’s (1968) bankruptcy prediction model as a starting point, a
methodological gap remains in accurately predicting turnaround, linking content
to process and context. Ohlson (1980) was one of the first to incorporate various
mediators in his model, but Shumway (2001) finds this to be incorrectly specified,
enhancing predictability by offering a dynamic hazard model. Chava and Jarrow
(2004) further modify the model to be applicable to both longitudinal monthly data
and the often-excluded financial service sector, again increasing its explanatory
power. However, most models are limited to quantitative data and dichotomous
variable operationalization, and such qualitative dimensions as firms’ cultural
changes are mostly neglected. Future works could address this gap by incorporating
both questionnaire results and qualitative panel data sets into dynamic hazard
models. Studies argue in the same vein as Haleblian et al. (2009) by investigating
single events over a longer period of time in great depth, which could enhance the
theoretical grounding for future bankruptcy prediction models. The resulting
research questions are manifold, linking quantitative to qualitative internal and
external context and integrating different social science research studies. For
instance: ‘‘How does the combination of human capital research on firm culture
during turnaround interact with financially distressed cost analyses?’’
7.3.3 Gap 9: Potential confounding and endogeneity
Finally, a common deficit of empirical performance analysis is the danger of
endogeneity found in research models. The reversed causality problem, as discussed
by Barker et al. (2001) and Giroud et al. (2012) could lead to a misinterpretation of
findings. Giroud et al. (2012) demonstrate in their study of corporate default that
linking a significant reduction in leverage to an increase in firm performance can
reverse causality. This is primarily because the anticipation of performance
improvements might lead banks to forgive debt, thus decreasing a firm’s leverage.
Molina (2005) similarly argues that ignoring the endogeneity of leverage can lead to
an underestimation of its effect on default probabilities. Researchers could address
this methodological gap of underestimating the endogeneity in context items by
resorting more often to multiple-stage regression models, using instrumental
variables to secure the correct model specifications. This enhanced methodology
would enable researchers to reinvestigate inconclusive empirical findings on
restructuring research, possibly finding alternative factor loadings for individual




This article aims to provide a comprehensive review and consolidation of corporate
turnaround research across various research streams. We contribute to turnaround
literature by offering a consolidation of 262 publications across multiple research
streams and theoretical perspectives, guided by a comprehensive framework.
Resorting to the more detailed corporate restructuring research classifications, we
can overcome the potential shortcomings of a merely dichotomous classification
according to ‘‘operational’’ and ‘‘strategic’’ turnaround actions and provide a more
detailed analysis of the numerous facets of turnaround during corporate distress. The
review holistically approaches the topic and considers a broad range of substreams
on turnaround content, processes, and contexts, as well as the interdependencies
between the various disciplines. We propose a research agenda based on a
comprehensive review, by deriving potential research opportunities from system-
atically identified gaps in corporate turnaround research. Specifically, we discuss
challenges in accurately measuring turnaround outcomes by contrasting the success
measures employed by different research streams. This article lays a foundation for
the prospective future ‘‘high tide’’ in turnaround research, following the turmoil of
the 2008 global financial crisis.
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